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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study relied on data gathered on school identifiers and characteristics, student
and teacher characteristics, and index scores of Kentucky public elementary schools,
collected from 2001-2008 at the school level. An extensive literature review was completed
in order to examine the effects of competition on public schools, both positive and negative.
This paper focused on the impact of public school competition on academic index
scores in Kentucky school districts. Competition was measured in two ways: by the number
of schools available per student in the district as well as the total district enrollment
controlling for the total number of schools in a district. The data were analyzed using both
a fixed-effects regression model and a between-effects regression model. The findings
indicate that from year to year, increases in district enrollment have a positive effect on
school index scores, but on average over the eight years, district enrollment actually has a
negative impact. Overall, the findings suggest that public school competition does not
appear to have a significant impact on school performance in Kentucky. Further analysis of
competition among schools is recommended in order to provide policy makers with a
better understanding of how competition, from both public and private institutions, can
improve the quality of schooling in Kentucky.
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INTRODUCTION
How best to go about increasing the quality of public schools is currently a
controversial and highly debated issue in the United States. Federal, state, and local school
boards across the nation have been faced with declining schools; prompting voters to rally
for change, often in the form of school choice. Similarly, the demand by parents for high
quality schools has led education reformers to look for new ways to improve the primary
and secondary public school system. Many researchers have argued that increased
competition can improve the quality of schools. This market-based reform, in the shape of
expanded parental choice, has been debated in the past twenty years with no definitive
answer as to whether this view can be substantiated. Proponents of school competition
argue that increased choice for parents forces schools to work harder to be effective and,
therefore, competitive in the education “market”. Those opposed to school competition
suggest that some parents may not be aware of their choice options, and that this lack of
awareness will hurt the worst schools with the most disadvantaged students. Significant
research has been done on school competition and choice in urban settings, but little
research has looked at competition among public schools in rural settings. Most literature
focuses on urban competition and choice options of private and charter schools often with
the use of vouchers. This study sought to examine the public elementary schools in
Kentucky, in geographic areas ranging from urban to rural including the Appalachian
region. When treated as a private market good, school competition might be an aspect in
determining school performance.
This paper examined competition among public schools and its impact on school
performance, as measured by academic index scores. The hypothesis was that school
4

competition would have a positive impact on school index scores, assuming increased
competition within districts requires public schools to work that much harder to keep highachieving students in their schools. In theory, school districts with fewer schools do not
have as much competition and therefore do not have the incentive to work to keep
students; their students have no alternative public school options and so school scores in
districts with fewer schools would be lower. Similarly, in rural areas there are often fewer
private school alternatives which provides even less incentive for the public schools to
remain competitive.
In the context of this paper, competition is measured in two ways. One measure
examines the number of schools in a district, controlling for the total student enrollment of
the district. The other is the ratio of the number of schools in a district to the number of
students in the district. Both methods are used to examine the effects of competition on
academic index scores.

TIEBOUT CHOICE
Charles Tiebout discussed his model regarding public choice in a 1956 paper
entitled A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. The Tiebout model states that the choice
process allows individuals to determine an equilibrium of the provision of local public
goods that are in harmony with the tastes and desires of the residents. In turn, the
population sorts into their optimum and best matching communities (Tiebout, 1956). An
analysis of Tiebout choice is important because it can provide quicker changes to American
schools than certain reforms because it allows families to locate where they choose and lets
them continue to move until they find a location that maximizes their utility i.e. voting with
5

their feet (Hoxby, 2002). The effects of education reform can take years to been seen, if
they are seen at all; however Tiebout choice allows the equilibrium effects of choice to be
seen in a much shorter time frame. In the absence of barriers to moving, housing and job
markets can affect the degree of Tiebout choice. In a metropolitan area where many of the
jobs and housing are located within one district, the cost of commuting to an adjacent
district is high. Whereas, in an area where several school districts are clustered near many
jobs, the cost of school choice is low. Tiebout choice is also important to understand when
examining school competition because reform is often introduced to extend school choice
options, not create them. Tiebout choice already accounts for some of the reasons families
choose to live and send their children to school where they do. The effects of new school
choice reforms may not be entirely attributed to those reforms.
This paper assumed that each student in the data set resided in the same county in
which they attend school. In other words, a student only considers public schools in their
county of residence. While this assumption does limit a student’s possible choice of schools,
it was necessary because the exact location of the school was known but not the location of
the residence of the student.

OVERVIEW OF CHOICE IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky’s public educational system is comprised of 120 county-based school
districts and 55 independent school districts. Kentucky’s geographic make up consists of
many large rural areas with very few urban areas. This landscape makes school choice and
competition unique and varied throughout the state. The restrictive somewhat language of
Kentucky’s Constitution with respect to education funding and the more restrictive
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interpretation of Kentucky’s state religion clauses make instituting a general voucher
program difficult (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice). Kentucky does not have a
private school choice program in place and is one of only ten states that have not passed
legislation regarding charter schools1. However, this may change as a result of the failure to
receive money from the Race to the Top Fund; the federal program designed to spur
reforms in state and local district K-12 education. Competitive grants to states were
awarded to encourage education innovation and reform based on four areas. Kentucky
received lower marks, due in part by the lack of charter schools in Kentucky. Kentucky
school districts also are held to the requirements of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under
No Child Left Behind.2 With a five-tier structure, consequences for the tiers increase each
consecutive year that a school does not make AYP. After two years of not making AYP (Tier
1), school choice must be provided as an option to children at the underperforming schools.
A 2009 phone survey of 1,200 Kentucky residents conducted by The Friedman
Foundation for Educational Choice found that fifty percent of K-12 parents would like to
send their child to a private school, while in reality only nine percent of students attend
private schools. Twelve percent of parents said they would send their children to charter
schools if they were an option in Kentucky. Only thirteen percent of parents said they
would choose traditional public schools, when in actuality ninety one percent of K-12
students attend traditional public schools. Based on the results of the survey, it appears
that Kentucky may be lacking a school choice system that is able to sufficiently match
Charter schools in the U.S. are schools that receive public money but are not subject to some of the rules,
regulations, and statutes that apply to other public schools. Charter schools are opened and attended by
choice, but are not allowed to charge tuition.
2 AYP results are based on the Kentucky Core Content Tests in reading and mathematics. Schools are required
to have specific percentages of students reaching proficiency or above in reading and mathematics each year
and to meet other criteria in order to make AYP.
1
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parents’ schooling preferences (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice , School
Choice Survey).
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is mixed opinion among education researchers regarding school competition and its
impact on school performance. Overall, the scope of the research on school choice reveals a
mixed picture, with some studies suggesting positive impacts, and others indicating
negative impacts. Great differences exist among school choice literature; in the overall
quality of the research as well as the conclusions the research supports.

Proponents of School Competition
As one of the earliest proponents of school choice, Milton Friedman argued that
vouchers for primary and secondary education would widen the options to parents and
provide positive outcomes for students. Friedman’s paper opines that, “Government,
preferably local governmental units, would give each child, through his parents, a specified
sum to be used solely in paying for his general education; the parents would be free to
spend this sum at a school of their own choice, provided it met certain minimum standards
laid down by the appropriate governmental unit. Such schools would be conducted under a
variety of auspices: by private enterprises operated for profit, nonprofit institutions
established by private endowment, religious bodies, and some even by governmental units”
(Friedman, 1955). Since the proposal by Friedman in the 1950’s, vouchers have been
discussed and widely debated.
In her paper, Hoxby (2002) found that Tiebout choice increases productivity in
schools and also improves achievement while lowering spending per student. Hoxby’s
8

research results have been seen as controversial, but she provided a starting point for
innovative ways to measure school competition. Additional research about the impact of
private schools on competition suggests the competition improves the quality of the public
schools (Dee, 1998). Dee’s research concluded that competition, even from private schools,
provides education benefits not just to those students who are able to choose their school;
the increase in competition has positive effects on student outcomes at all competing
schools.
Several researchers argue that the higher the level of competition among school
districts, the more pressure there is for the individual districts to perform in order to
maintain their student base. Chubb and Mo hypothesize that public schools struggle more
than private schools because they have less autonomy and are a product of the democratic
institution (1988). Their work has helped develop a framework for school choice in public
schools. Blair and Staley (1995) examined evidence from Borland and Howsen (1992)
which proposed that standardized test scores would be higher in areas with more
competition among schools and districts. Blair and Staley found that metropolitan areas
with less public school competition have lower school quality. They also found that
competition from neighboring schools has a positive effect on student performance.
A review of school choice options in Chicago Public Schools found that students who
chose to attend a public school other than the one they were zoned for, were more likely to
graduate than those students who stayed at their zone school (Cullen, Jacob, Levitt, 2005).
Cullen et al also found that students are more likely to graduate if they opt out of their zone
school, but that they do so for reasons other than peers, resources, teachers or curricula.
They hypothesize that students may leave their local schools to attend schools with higher
9

levels of outputs such as higher average test scores and graduation rates. While Cullen et al
do not have an exact explanation for the decision of students to opt out of their assigned
school, their research does support the concept that competition increases productivity.
Selection bias can be a concern when examining school choice both in public and
private schools and is something that should be carefully examined. For example, it is
possible that students who are seeking better educational institutes are doing so because
they (or their parents) have higher education aspirations. This could make the receiving
school appear better and the losing school appear worse even if they are both similarly
“productive” in delivering student performance. Schneider, Teske, Marschall, Mintrom, and
Roch (1997) acknowledge that parents who are actively choosing alternative schools may
bias research results because they are not a random selection of parents in the district.
Schneider et al, like many others, attempt to put in place controls in an effort to control for
bias. It can only be assumed that these controls allow for an accurate portrayal of school
choice.

Opponents of School Competition
In opposition to the arguments for the benefits of school competition, there is
literature which poses the idea that competition has negative effects on productivity and
performance. McMillan (2000) argues that the effect of school competition is close to zero
and can sometimes have a negative impact on certain communities by lowering the quality
of education offered. McMillan goes on to suggest that targeted vouchers, given to poor
households to pay tuition and fees for their children's schooling at participating non-public
schools, would be a better instrument to increase productivity. In a 2006 paper, Rothstein
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looked for evidence of parental demand by examining the distribution of student outcomes
across schools. After researching the incentive effects of competition among districts he
found, contradictory to his initial hypothesis, that school choice did not have a significant
impact on increased school effectiveness. He discussed the idea that “effectiveness sorting”
only disappears if parents do not attach any value to effectiveness or peer groups.
Rothstein holds that this is unlikely to happen because parents typically realize the
importance of a child’s peer group. He does, however, caution against generalizing the
paper’s results to choice markets that break up school assignment from residential
location. He does so on the basis that school choice may be sensitive to other factors such
as nonschool neighborhood amenities that were not considered in the paper. In another
paper, titled Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? A
Comment on Hoxby, Rothstein replicated Hoxby’s research methods with a corrected data
set she supplied. When Rothstein ran the data, he found that the model was highly sensitive
to alterations. He also found that, conversely to Hoxby’s results, the effect of choice on
achievement was not significant. While Hoxby’s decision to count the number of rivers and
streams in a geographical area to determine a school district’s “market share” and
boundaries was creative, according to Rothstein the data and methodology had several
errors which, when corrected, yielded results that were not significant. In a recent paper,
Loeb, Valant, and Kasman (2011) looked at current choice reforms and their effects on
student achievement. Their paper discussed arguments as to why one might expect choice
and competition to improve student achievement based on demand side forces, the school
choosers such as parents, and supply side forces, the schools. They worked with the
Milwaukee Public Schools in 2010 to survey principals about how they felt their school
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competed for students. Their results found that when the school leaders felt any
competition for students, they responded by trying to influence the information received
by the parents rather than actually improving the school to better meet the student’s needs.
Their conclusion suggested that given the interest surrounding school choice, much of the
results have been underwhelming and show only modest benefits. They do however
acknowledge that although some research has shown that school choice efforts do not
always have the desired results, it is important to continue to study them because we still
have much to learn about choice options.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Data
There are nearly 645,000 students enrolled in the Kentucky public school system in
grades K-12. The school level data used in this paper were collected from the Kentucky
Department of Education from the 2001-2008 school years. Missing data were filled in
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD).3 The dataset
included information on school identifiers and characteristics, student characteristics,
teacher characteristics, and index scores, all collected at the school level. Information on
the geographic land area of the school districts was collected from the Census Bureau
TIGER files for school districts. The data were collected from all 120 county-based school
districts in Kentucky, as well as the 55 independent school districts. The dataset consisted
of 10,250 observations from 1,279 schools over the eight year period. Middle schools and

The data was originally collected by Dr. Eugenia Toma and her staff. It includes data from the Appalachian
Math Science Partnership and Non-Appalachian Math Science Partnership school districts in Kentucky from
2001-2008.
3
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high schools were dropped from the data set because of the limited number of schools
available in each district. Data from elementary schools were used in an attempt to achieve
a more accurate measure of competition for the schools.
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Variable
Attendance

Description
average daily student attendance

Student:Teacher student to teacher ratio
Enrollment

total school enrollment

Spending

spending per student in dollars

Ethnicity White

percent of white students in school

Free/Reduced
Lunch

percent of students in school on
free/reduced price lunch (poverty)

Experience

average years experience of all
teachers in school

Lagged Index
Score

lagged student academic index score

Index Score

student academic index score

Schools Per
Student

number of schools per student

District
Enrollment

log of total district enrollment

Total Schools

log of total schools in district

Master's

percent of teachers in school with a
Master's degree

Area

land area of school district

School achievement was measured as a function of the student academic index,
standardized across time and school level. The Kentucky Department of Education defines
the academic index as a number on a 0-140 scale that calculates how all students
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performed on all of the seven Core Content subjects (reading, math, science, social studies,
on-demand writing, arts & humanities, practical living/vocational studies, writing, and
non-academic). An index of 100 is equivalent to average student performance, being
measured as proficient, but may include some students at the distinguished level and some
at the novice and apprentice levels. An index of 140 would mean students performed at the
distinguished level in all subjects.
The academic index provided the best single number for comparing the
performance of different student groups and getting an overview of achievement gap issues
(2003 CATS Interpretive Guide). A student academic index score variable was also
generated with a one-year lag to attempt to capture prior impacts on student achievement.
The lagged academic index score separates any influences on the index score from year to
year, allowing for achievement to be accurately credited to the school or teacher for that
year alone.
In this paper, competition was measured in two ways: by the number of schools per
student in the district as well as the district enrollment controlling for the total number of
schools in a district.

Research Model
The aim for this paper was to determine the effects of school competition on student
achievement by holding constant the effects from other variables. Possible random error
was reduced by accounting for all the variables related to the schools, students, and
teachers. Variables used to represent school inputs in the model were student teacher
ratio, spending per student, average years of teacher experience, and percent of teachers
14

with a Master’s degree. The variables used to represent the family and socioeconomic
status were the percent average daily attendance, percent white students, and percent free
and reduced lunch, which is used to measure the poverty level.
As discussed previously, two measures of competition were used to determine the
impact of competition on school performance, as measured by academic index scores.
Because of the highly skewed nature of the data due to some outlying school districts, the
district enrollment and total schools variables were converted to logarithms to show the
logarithmic effect rather than the linear effect of the two variables. The logarithm of a
number to a given base is the exponent to which the base must be raised to produce that number.
Logarithmic scales reduce wide-ranging quantities to smaller scopes. In this case, a logarithm
was utilized to diminished some of the variance in the district enrollment and total schools
variables, providing a more normal distribution of the variables.
Two methods of estimation were used to determine the effect of public school
competition on school performance. A fixed-effects model was used to estimate the effects
of changes in the explanatory variables, such as ratio of students to teachers or poverty
level, on changes in the school academic index scores. A fixed-effects model controls for
characteristics of the schools that are constant over time but that do vary considerably
between schools and could impair the ability to isolate the effects of the variables of
interest. By focusing on the changes over time for each school, the effect the changes have
on school performance can be determined. By examining the characteristics within a school
it was possible to determine whether a change within a school was associated with changes
in school test scores over time.
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A between-effects model was also used to estimate what how differences between
schools affected school index scores. Comparing the differences in characteristics between
schools identified what average school characteristics are associated with higher or lower
school scores.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Elementary Schools
Measure
na
Mean
Attendance
5766
82.62218
Student:Teacher
5799
15.45144
Enrollment
5800
406.1021
Spending
5767
5217.99
Ethnicity White
5462
74.76224
Free/Reduced
5717
57.23551
Lunch
Experience
5768
11.8146
Lagged Index
5700
76.84394
Score
Index Score
5626
80.12947
Schools Per
5800
0.0021529
Student
District
5800
15874.11
Enrollment
Total Schools
5800
25.95966
Master's
5794
66.90099
Area
5792
291.5675
A n refers to the number of observations.
B StDev refers to the standard deviation.

StDevb
32.16563
2.831889
163.6612
2485.58
33.96492
22.05328

Min
0
6
69
0
0
0

Max
98
122.9
1170
14775
100
100

2.669018
13.65018

1.255814
33.4

26
125.4

13.81397
0.0007977
26702.65

36.2
125.4
0.001131 0.011583
139

90946

39.32704
1
135
28.7689
0
100
154.299 0.8126298 685.6155

For both estimation methods, the student academic index was regressed at the
district level on demographic controls, teacher characteristics in the school, and the school
competition measures of schools per student and the district enrollment controlling for the
number of schools per district, leaving all other sources in Kentucky as the omitted base
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category. Due to the panel form of the data, multiple observations of many variables over a
period of time, a time trend regression was used.

Research Question 1: Does an increase in school competition improve school performance?

This first regression model used a fixed-effect estimator of competition4. The fixedeffects model made it possible to control for all stable aspects of the individual school
characteristics, even if they vary over time and cannot be measured. The fixed-effects
estimation also allowed for general heteroscedasticity (robust estimation) and correlations
within schools (clustering). This model is represented by:
Yit = A + β1X1 + β2X2 + ... + βnXn + αi + εit
where Y signifies the academic index score of school i in year t, X represents the variables
of interest, α denotes the unobserved individual school effect, and ε is the random error in
the model.

Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between school competition and school
performance?

A secondary between-effects model was used to recover any hidden effects of the
variables that may have been pulled into the effect of the environments of the individual
schools. This estimation allowed for the isolation of effects of the variables that remained

4

An indicator was used to represent all omitted variables
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constant over time. The model used aggregated data to test effects between schools,
assuming no school and time effect. The model is represented by:
Yit = A + β1X1 + β2X2 + ... + βnXn + εit
where Y again signifies the academic index score of school i in year t, X represents the
variables of interest, and ε is the random error in the model.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The results of the empirical analysis were unexpected and in contradiction with the
original hypothesis of competition in Kentucky. As previously mentioned, the hypothesis
assumed that school competition would have a positive impact on school index scores.
When measuring competition by number of schools per student in the district, the effect of
competition was not significant (Table 3, Model 1). This was in opposition to the original
theory that the availability of more schools to a student would increase the school
performance. The second model of competition looked at district enrollment and total
schools in the district as separate variables (Table 3, Model 2). In this model, yearly
increases in district enrollment positively impacted school achievement, while the change
in total number of schools was not significant.
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Table 3: Fixed-effects Regression Output
Elementary Schools
Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics)
Independent Variables
Attendance

Model 1

Model 2

0.06

(3.20)*

0.06

(3.19)*

-0.23

(-2.32)*

-0.24

(-2.44)*

0.00

(18.59)*

0.00

(18.33)*

-0.01

(-1.14 )

-0.01

(-0.96)

0.06

(5.42)*

0.06

(5.16)*

-0.04

(-0.46)

-0.01

(-0.11)

Lagged Index Score

0.20

(18.41)*

0.19

(18.18)*

Schools Per Student

-1072

(-1.01)

-

-

District Enrollment

-

-

8.51

(2.78)*

Total Schools

-

-

-3.93

(-1.39)

0.07

(5.98)*

0.07

(5.97)*

Student:Teacher
Spending
Ethnicity White
Free/Reduced Lunch
Experience

Master's
* significant at .05 confidence level
** significant at .1 confidence level

The positive effect of district enrollment on index scores could be attributed to the
attraction of students to districts with higher test scores for a given year, or better teachers
rather than a factor of competition itself. Attendance, spending per student, and teachers
with a Master’s degree were all significant with a positive coefficient. These results were
not surprising, indicating that schools with higher attendance, higher spending per student,
and teachers with Master’s degrees had positive impacts on school performance.
Interestingly, free & reduced lunch had a positive, albeit nominal, impact on school index
scores. While this seems counter intuitive, a possible explanation may be that the schools in
the most impoverished areas are typically the schools that have not been making adequate
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yearly progress. These schools that were so far behind the state average only needed to
make minimal changes to result in gains in scores, while the schools that were already
doing fairly well had to work harder for smaller gains.
When the two measures of competition were run with a between-effects estimator,
schools per student was still not significant (Table 4, Model 1). The between-effects model
provided another unexpected result, showing that on average for the eight years, higher
district enrollment had a negative impact on academic index scores while the total number
of schools was not significant (Table 4, Model 2). One reason for this result could be that
there is a certain capacity level for schools and when that capacity level is exceeded, it has
negative implications for school performance. Teachers with a Master’s degree, percentage
of white students, and the total land area of the school district are significant and have a
positive impact on school index scores. Free and reduced lunch, a measure of poverty, was
significant and had a negative impact on school achievement. These results were expected
given the normal assumptions of such variables on school performance as measured by the
academic index score. If there is indeed a competitive effect among public schools in
Kentucky, it is being overwhelmed by something else that the model was unable to capture.
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Table 4: Between-effects Regression Output
Elementary Schools
Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics)
Independent Variables
Attendance

Model 1

Model 2

0.00

(0.04)

0.00

(0.05)

Student:Teacher

-0.06

(-0.44)

0.01

(0.08)

Spending

-0.00

(-0.91)

-0.00

(-0.13)

0.10

(4.84)*

0.08

(3.36)*

-0.20

(-11.91)*

-0.21

(-11.89)*

Experience

0.09

(0.74)

0.07

(0.54)

Lagged Index Score

0.48

(13.74)*

0.48

(13.66)*

Schools Per Student

6.11

(1.55)

-

-

District Enrollment

-

-

-2.37

(-2.10)*

Total Schools

-

-

1.96

(1.55)

Master's

0.18

(4.67)*

0.19

(4.79)*

Area

0.00

(3.52)*

0.00

(3.74)*

Ethnicity White
Free/Reduced Lunch

* significant at .05 confidence level
** significant at .1 confidence level

DISCUSSION
Recommendations
A basic yet serious question for policy makers is whether public choice actually
matters in Kentucky. Significant research has been done on private and charter school
competition, with results suggesting that the competition from these options does have an
impact on public schools. However, given the results of this research, it appears that public
schools in Kentucky do not serve as competition to each other in regards to improving
school performance.
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The findings, showing little correlation between competition among public schools
and improvement on academic index scores, have important policy implications. This study
concluded that yearly increases in district enrollment had positive effects on school
performance, but on average over the eight years examined, increased district enrollment
had negative effects. Focusing greater attention on schools which saw an increase from
year to year could improve the understanding of what attracts students to certain schools.

Limitations
There were several limitations to the model in this paper, partially due to the nature
of the dataset. These data use provided information solely on public schools in Kentucky.
Given the difficulty of accurately measuring public school competition in Kentucky, a more
appropriate comparison might have been competition as measured against private schools.
In this paper, school performance was measured by standardized test results. While
this is a common variable often used to measure school performance, it is possible that
public schools are competing with one another but that the competition is not influencing
school performance.
As previous literature has shown, students who opt out of their assigned school or
school district may be self-selecting into new schools because of some type of perceived
advantages. This transfer might increase the performance of the new school and decrease
the performance of the old school without the student’s performance actually changing. A
more direct measure could be whether students who transfer have better outcomes than
they would have if they had not transferred. Unfortunately, since the data set was collected

22

at a school level, it did not track students who switched into or out of their designated
school.
Previously in the paper, it was mentioned that the assumption was made that
students only attend public schools in their county of residence because the exact location
of the school was known but not the location of the residence of the student. This study
could have been improved if student level data were available and included the location of
the student’s residence, it might better determine a student’s school choice set and in turn
provide more relevant information regarding the competition in their catchment area.
For this paper, district enrollment and total schools were converted to logarithms to
provide a more normal distribution of the variables. This in essence discarded Jefferson
and Fayette County from the model as outliers due to their high number of elementary
schools relative to other counties. While this was necessary to provide an accurate measure
of competition, it might not accurately portray the public school options of students living
in the counties surrounding Jefferson and Fayette.
Finally, it may simply be that there was not enough variance in rural Kentucky
school districts to see any effects of competition. The attributes of public schools in
Kentucky do not dramatically vary from each other, and therefore any effects of
competition on school performance are difficult to measure.

Future Research
Given the somewhat unexpected results of this study, it seems that a better
understanding of the impact of competition could be gleaned from continued research in
Kentucky, both in rural and urban school districts. The primary question of this study was
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whether increased competition has an impact on school academic index scores. Based on
the results, a definitive statement on public competition cannot be made through this
research. However, the results presented here suggest that future evidence on how
competition impacts public schools in Kentucky will have to acknowledge the impact of
private schools and the attributes of neighboring public schools.
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